Gerpolek, gerilya-politik-ekonomi (Seri Djambatan klasik) [Tan Malaka] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Military strategy for combating. It is the first extract of the booklet “The Partisan and his Military, Political and Economic Struggle” (GERPOLEK) written by Tan Malakka May when he was. GERPOLEK. (Chapters XI – XIII). Tan Malaka (). This cut down version of GERPOLEK is translated from the French, which is translated from the Dutch which.

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It should be used with caution therefore but will be useful as a crib when a translation straight from Bahasa geroplek English is done. Nevertheless Tan Malakka had a great reputation as an educator of the workers and peasants using simple grammatical constructions to explain complex matters and this seems to come through.

Note by translator and transcriber, Ted Crawford July This booklet reached us in the Malayan language; the translation was made initially in Dutch, then in French. Thus we cannot swear that it is accurate in every particular. The booklet of Tan Malakka was written for fighters in the partisan gerpolekk fighting since mqlaka the forces of the Dutch army in the Indonesian archipelago.

It explains in detail the views of the author on the partisan war. For Tan Malakka, the conduct of the military operations, the policy orientation to follow, the diplomatic discussions to engage in, the economic measures to carry out, constitute a coherent whole tending towards a single objective: Written for a national liberation movement of a colony and being presented in the form of the expression of nationalism arising from an oppressed people, the booklet of Tan Malakka pushed the ultimate consequences of this revolutionary nationalism by giving it an absolutely clear proletarian class orientation.

This orientation is in perfect agreement with the theory of permanent revolution, without mentioning it or using an identical vocabulary.

This idea is a leitmotiv in the whole text. In certain places, Tan Malakka expressed it with even greater clarity: The brilliant and simple at the same time – one feels in Tan Malakka a teacher of the backward masses of enormous capacity to whom he manages to explain the most complicated problems of the military strategy — the booklet of Tan Malakka is limited to the problems of the anti-colonialist struggle in Indonesia. The international problems are only touched on, and only directly concerning the questions of the Indonesian revolution.

That is why Tan Malakka does not deal gerpolwk the question of Stalinism and just limits himself to some general observations. But when he deals with concrete positions, he each time differentiates himself in a very clearly from Stalinist positions.

For Indonesia, the revolutionary program that he proposes opposes the opportunist tactic of class collaboration and conciliation with imperialism continued by the Stalinists until their criminal putschist ttan in at Madioen.

Tan Malaka: Communism and Pan-Islamism ()

When he deals with the question of the UN. When he speaks about the danger of war, he says that this danger will remain as long as capital remains. When he speaks about Germany defeated in the Second World War, he speaks of a people oppressed by the victors. Isolated from the world in his prison, cut-off from the most basic sources of information, Tan Malakka oriented malaks with remarkable class instinct even in international questions and one can only admire the clarity of this instinct.

When the Dutch imperialist armies for the second time launched a military attack against the territory of the Republic, the Indonesian masses responded by a mass levy of partisans which, soon, was likely to throw the imperialists into the sea. Driven back by the threat of inevitable defeat, the government of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia and began to evacuate its troops.

The power of the revolutionary upsurge has since then transformed United States of Indonesia into a single centralised Republic and today directly threatens capitalist property. The lack of space prevents us from publishing the booklet as a whole. We will publish in this number all the first part which deals with the political problems of the Indonesian revolution. After this part follows a chapter dealing with general problems of military strategy which is not of particular interest to the Western reader.

In the next number of our review, we will reproduce large extracts from the third and fourth part of gerpplek booklet, dealing with specific military problems of the partisan war and the economic questions of the Indonesian revolution. We are on the edge of the abyss. In the economic, financial and military areas possibilities for us are limited malzka the extreme.

Gedpolek is the result of two years of negotiations. The unity of the people in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism has been broken. Most Indonesian territory is isolated, subject to the authority of the enemy, dominated again by the Netherlands.


Several puppet States have been created and set one against the other. The economy and finances of the territories still administered by the Republic are in the greatest disorder.

Such is the road followed since the revolution! When this broke out, 79 million Indonesians were united in the fight against capitalism and imperialism. All the sources of the authority were in the hands of the masses. The entire population took the initiative in creating an army and defence services which extended all along the coasts and included all the cities and all the villages.

Firmly united it organised its defence and was ready for every sacrifice. Is it possible to find the spirit of August 17, ? The history alone will be able to answer this question. But if history determines the course of the events, we cannot remain impassive in front of the dangers which threaten the country and are likely to lead it to its loss.

I estimate that one of measures which can most contribute to save the country, is the creation on land and sea, everywhere, of guerrillas. It is to express my opinions on this subject that, I wrote this booklet. Admittedly it is malka that the author is not an expert of malakq art of warfare; however he had certain contacts with soldiers, abroad as well as in Indonesia, and he always felt attracted by the science of the war.

The knowledge of which he made use in this work was born from conversations with soldiers and reading, a venture of a few years ago, of books and reviews devoted to the problems of the army.

Gerpolek – Tan Malaka – Google Books

This knowledge is the result of a study which took me more than ger;olek years. The wish of the author, when he was young and was in Europe, to become an officer encountered many objections and important obstacles; but he had as a result, during the last world ferpolek, concentrated his attention on books and reviews devoted to military problems.

The training thus acquired, was not lost later on, although the long years spent abroad has gerpolsk certain conceptions. Between the four walls of stone and behind the iron bars, the author does not have any works which enable him to check the exactitude of his opinions. Under these conditions, it is possible that certain military rules which he formulates do not seem very satisfactory.

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I hope and I am convinced that the experts and the combatants will supplement him and eliminate the useless errors and developments that it includes. I hope and I am convinced that they will forgive me my errors and my useless comments. But the author, in his forced isolation, does malka wish to rule on all military problems, essential aspects of han revolution; but only to draw the attention to their importance.

I wish my comrades in combat, who know military questions better than me, to take the initiative in writing a work on the art of the war. Similar work is necessary if one wants to popularise the art of warfare among the masses and the youth. In this case I reckon that the Japanese instruction for 2 to 3 years and more especially the instruction in the technique and conduct of war developed during 2 to 3 years of engagements on the Indonesian battle fields are enough and are well-known to tens of thousands of soldiers.

I only want to draw attention to some military precepts which appear important to me. These are the principles which, beside other political and economic subjects, must be learnt by the partisans, be they officers or soldiers. The technique of the Spanish partisans geprolek disorganized the armies of Napoleon; that of the Boers combatants who held in check the strong modern army of the English; that of the Russian partisans who during the Second World War which has just finished completely discountenanced the motorized German forces.

This tactic is one of the most important weapons of the fight of oppressed and badly equipped people against an enemy with a modern armament. I hope that this booklet, written hastily in the most difficult circumstances, will be able to be useful to young people, and to the heroic combatants of the proletariat of Gerpolfk Indonesia. From its birth, on August 17,until today May 17,the Republic underwent many changes. During these two years, three quarters of existence, it only retreated from the economic, political, military and diplomatic as well as moral point of view.

We can divide the history of the Ma,aka into two periods, one period of victorious fighting and a period of diplomatic defeats. Gerpplek first period, that of the victorious fighting, gerpollek on August 17, and finished on March 17, Its beginning was marked by the proclamation of independence, its end by the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front at Madioen.


The period of the diplomatic failures lasted from March 17, until today. It began with the arrests at Madioen and still continues, always marked by diplomatic negotiations. What is the basis of this division into two periods from a jalaka point of view? In short, the struggle until the departure of the malaak enemy was replaced gerpokek a tactic of concessions in order to make peace with the enemy. What is the basis of this division in two periods from the economic point of view?

What is the basis of this division into two periods from the military point of view? In short, the military tactics which made it possible to weaken and finally to overcome the enemy were replaced by a policy which gave the enemy the opportunity to be reinforced while we weakened.

What is the basis of this division in two periods from the diplomatic point of view? It arose from the declaration of the former prime minister Amir Sjarifuddin before the Military High Court which dealt with the affair of June 3,that is the arrest of the leaders of the Malzka Front at Taj, as arising from the policy of diplomatic negotiations.

According to the declaration of Amir Sjarifuddin, the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front by the republican government took place on the written request to the Indonesian delegation by the Gepolek. This delegation was a republican contact mission which kept at this time links with English and Dutch representatives.

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The written request with the object of the arrest did not emanate from the government of the Republic. Thus it was inspired by foreigners, the English or the Dutch. The government thus carried out the arrest of its citizens, actually, at the request of the enemy. It was extremely regrettable for verpolek interested parties; it was still more for the Indonesian State whose sovereignty was not respected. What were the consequences of this new policy which replaced struggle with negotiation?

Over all Indonesia, in every society, in every party, maaka every military authority, the spirit of initiative, of decision, of unanimity, of the offensive, yielded place to acceptance, passivity, weakness, division and reciprocal mistrust. If we draw up from the point of view political, economic, military and social, the profit and loss account gsrpolek two periods, we arrive roughly at the following image.

All the territory of some 1, square kilometres of land and approximately 12 million square kilometres of seas was under the authority of the Republic. But the agreement of Renville further decreased this territory. The whole population of 70 million inhabitants was ruled by the sovereign authority of the Republic.

All plantations rubber, coffee, tea, sisal, etcall factories sugar refineries, metallurgy, textiles, paper millsall the mining companies oil, coal, tin, bauxite, gold, money, etcowned by malaak enemy or their allies, were under the authority of the Republic. The agreements of Lingadjatti and Renville recognized the right of ta ownership, whether by nationals of a friendly nation or of an enemy State which had invaded the territory of the Republic.

All the means of transport, terrestrial or maritime, were the property of the Republic and malama subjected to its authority cars, trucks, trains for the transport of the people and the goods of the countryside and the cities towards the ports. All mslaka ships in service or construction, intended to transport the people and the goods of an island to another and from Indonesia to abroad, were in the hands of the people.

Thus the Republic held the principal commercial tools. Through the property of most of the companies, minies, plantations, banks and means of transport, the Indonesian people could quickly have remedied their economic backwardness and have ensured a satisfying standard of living for everyone.

In accordance with the agreements of Lingadjatti and Renville, the Dutch have the right to retake malaks possessions. Thus they will quickly be able to dominate transport, both by sea and land again. When they again take the possession of the plantations, the factories and mines, they will again dominate domestic and external trade as at the time of the Dutch Indies.

Already during negotiations, the Dutch secured the possession of almost all the plantations, factories and mines, as well as important ports.